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Abstract—Under the headline “AI safety”, a wide-reaching
issue is being discussed, whether in the future some “superhuman
artificial intelligence” / “superintelligence” could could pose a
threat to humanity. In addition, the late Steven Hawking warned
that the rise of robots may be disastrous for mankind. A
major concern is that even benevolent superhuman artificial
intelligence (AI) may become seriously harmful if its given
goals are not exactly aligned with ours, or if we cannot specify
precisely its objective function. Metaphorically, this is compared
to king Midas in Greek mythology, who expressed the wish that
everything he touched should turn to gold, but obviously this
wish was not specified precisely enough. In our view, this sounds
like requirements problems and the challenge of their precise
formulation. (To our best knowledge, this has not been pointed
out yet.) As usual in requirements engineering (RE), ambiguity
or incompleteness may cause problems. In addition, the overall
issue calls for a major RE endeavor, figuring out the wishes
and the needs with regard to a superintelligence, which will in
our opinion most likely be a very complex software-intensive
system based on AI. This may even entail theoretically defining
an extended requirements problem.
Index Terms—Artificial intelligence, superintelligence, AI
safety, requirements problem
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of technology becoming sentient has been a
common theme in the literature and movies for decades. One
might think of the famous movie “2001: A Space Odyssey”
by Stanley Kubrick, the Matrix, or the Terminator movies.
These stories seem to be mostly consistent in the impression
that a suddenly arising uncontrolled Artificial Intelligence
(AI) will not mean us well, but is more likely to stand in
direct opposition to humanity’s goals. Furthermore, the AIs
described in books and movies are never dumb machines, but
rather potent entities with cognitive superpowers far beyond
the capacities of human general intelligence — they are
superintelligent. In his book “Superintelligence” [1], Oxford
philosophy professor Nick Bostrom provides good reasons to
believe that we can create such an entity.
In the AI research priorities document published in [2], apart
from the desirability of safety, e.g., of self-driving cars, “AI
safety” is addressed with regard to “superhuman AI”. This is
partly based on forecasting work on intelligence explosion and
“superintelligence” [1], where the importance of given goals
to be exactly aligned with those of mankind is emphasized.
Even that may be insufficient, however, the system must also
somehow be deliberately constructed to pursue them [1].
In terms of requests like “Make paperclips”, such a system is
envisaged to take everything it can (with high “intelligence”)
and to make as many paperclips as it can make, whatever
it may cost. Much like the example of king Midas or the
core theme of the movie with the title “Bedazzled”, we view
this as a requirement that is not specified precisely enough.
While other references regarding “AI safety” can be found
at https://vkrakovna.wordpress.com/ai-safety-resources/, it is
mentioned nowhere that it is actually a problem with require-
ments.
Since mankind may eventually create a “superintelligence”,
it should rather sooner than later specify the requirements on
such a system, which are traditionally the required functions,
qualities and constraints. Goal-oriented RE (GORE) focusses
on goals, but these are usually goals of the stakeholders
rather than those of an AI system (for GORE see, e.g.,
[3], [4] and successor work, and the very recent mapping
study [5]). Hence, we propose to extend GORE theoretically
in this direction for “AI safety”, where the goals of the
“superintelligence” based on AI technology are supposedly
of critical importance. Note, that such goals will most likely
be conditions of something to achieve, in contrast to certain
problem-solving algorithms where goals are defined states,
see, e.g., [6], [7]. For unidirectional search, conditions as goals
can be used, in contrast to bidirectional search.
Reasoning of a superintelligence on its own goals may
involve a kind of self-awareness [8], or at least self-
representation [9]. It is not clear, however, what the impli-
cations are on the problem at hand.
Having a glass-box view on a system implementing a
superintelligence may be helpful for keeping control of it,
such as following an approach to (object-oriented) software
engineering for AI systems [10], [11]. Also making architec-
tural decisions upfront, e.g., for a generic architecture [12],
may be useful in this regard. Another approach is to model
safety frameworks, see, e.g., [13]. However, implementing a
superintelligence may well involve different approaches such
as deep neural networks, which are considered opaque, or
approaches yet to be developed. Hence, we take a black-box
view here and propose to focus on requirements.
Strictly speaking, the notion “AI safety” is misleading in
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SOURCE: [1, P. 19]
our opinion, since it may also include the safety of certain
AI-based systems, e.g., self-driving cars. Hence, we prefer the
notion of “superintelligence safety”.
Safety of software-intensive systems is certainly a related
area [14], [15], but it is primarily concerned with hazards in the
environment of the system and related safety risks. Functional
safety as dealt with, e.g., in the current automotive standard
ISO 26262 focuses on failures of functions and how to manage
them. Hence, we do not see how previous safety research could
help much with regard to superintelligence safety.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following
manner. First, we provide some background material on super-
intelligence safety, in order to make this paper self-contained.
Then we view superintelligence safety from the perspective
of RE, and envisage formulating requirements accordingly. In
order to address the essence of the given issue, we argue for
doing RE on the superintelligence in the first place. Finally, we
motivate how the theory of the requirements problem should
be extended to cover goals of a superintelligence.
II. BACKGROUND ON SUPERINTELLIGENCE SAFETY
Surveys revealed that AI experts attribute a moderate likeli-
hood of superintelligence emerging within a 100-year horizon,
as can be seen in Tables I and II.1 Several AI experts where
asked to estimate a year by which the likelihood of having
created Human-Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI) and su-
perintelligence, respectively, reaches a certain percentage.
Assuming the creation of a superintelligence is possible,
how can we control it and avoid the doomsday scenarios so
eloquently depicted by authors and film directors? While an
emerging superintelligence might not be inherently malevo-
lent, it still poses a great risk. Without any information about
the internal workings of such an entity, we have to assume
that its way of ‘thinking’ might be very different from the
way a human thinks. A superintelligence most likely will not
share human morals or have a concept of value at all, if the
developers did not intentionally design it to have one.
While the most terrifying scenario is a malevolent superin-
telligence with the intent to eradicate humanity, another poten-
tial scenario is a superintelligence with no inherent motivations
1PT-AI: Participants of the conference Philosophy and Theory of AI, 2011.
AGI: Participants of the conference Artificial General Intelligence and Impacts
and Risks of Artificial General Intelligence, 2012. EETN: Sampled members
of the Greek Association for Artificial Intelligence, 2013. TOP100: The 100
top authors in artificial intelligence, measured by citation index, May 2013
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at all, simply following the instructions of it’s creator to the
best of its abilities. Bostrom describes some of the abilities
a superintelligence could have under the term “Cognitive
Superpowers” [1, p. 91]. A superintelligence could excel at
strategic planning, forecasting, analysis for optimizing chances
of achieving distant goals, social and psychological modeling
and manipulation, rhetoric persuasion, hacking into computer
systems, design and modeling of advanced technologies, and
the list goes on [1, p. 94].
One can see that even equipped with only a subset of these
skills, a superintelligence pursuing a goal to the best of its abil-
ities and without being constrained by concepts like morality
or value, can cause substantial damage to its environment.
Bostrom depicts this with his famous thought experiment
where a superintelligence is given the simple task to make
as many paper clips as possible. While the superintelligence
might start off by acquiring monetary resources by predicting
the stock market and building paper clip factories, it may not
just stop there. Since its goal is the unconstrained maximiza-
tion of the production of paperclips, it will soon discover that
humans pose a hindrance to its endeavor, as we might try to
stop the superintelligence from producing more paperclips or
even try to shut it off. Since the superintelligence is multiple
magnitudes smarter than humanity combined, humanity fails
to stop the superintelligence and ultimately the whole world
(the whole observable universe, in fact) will be made into
paperclips.
Even if this was just a contrived example, one can see
the risks of giving a superintelligence an unconstrained op-
timization problem. This argument is also extended in [1]
to constrained optimization problems, but the details are not
necessary for our paper.
III. SPECIFYING AND COMMUNICATING REQUIREMENTS
TO A SUPERINTELLIGENCE
Under the (usually unrealistic) assumption that we knew the
requirements already, ‘just‘ telling the superintelligence about
them properly is the problem here. It can be decomposed into
specifying and communicating.
According to the Standard ISO/IEC 10746-2:2009 Informa-
tion technology – Open Distributed Processing – Reference
Model: Foundations, 7.4, a specification is a “concrete rep-
resentation of a model in some notation”. In order to better
understand this sub-problem of specifying requirements, let
us follow the observation in [16] that requirements repre-
sentations are often confused with requirements per se. This
confusion is also widespread in practice, as exemplified in the
very recent Standard ISO SE Vocabulary 24765:2017. In fact,
it defines a requirement both as a “statement that translates or
expresses a need and its associated constraints and conditions”
and “a condition or capability that must be present in a product
. . . ” (dots inserted).
As it is well-known in RE, specifying requirements can be
done informally, say, using some natural language, or formally,
e.g., using some formal logic as the notation. Possibilities for
semi-formal representations within this spectrum are many-
fold.
In order to avoid ambiguity in the course of specifying
requirements for a superintelligence, formal representation of
the requirements should be the choice, of course, possibly in
some formal logic. Grounding the logic used in the domain
will, however, still leave loopholes for the superintelligence to
‘misunderstand’ the given specification of our requirements.
For example, for some predicate on paperclips, a grounding
of what paperclips are in the real world will be necessary.
In addition, incompleteness of the specification remains an
open issue. Unfortunately, no general solution appears to be
feasible at the current state of the art in RE.
Communicating a given requirements specification to a
superintelligence may be investigated according to [17], based
on speech-act theory [18], under the premise that stakehold-
ers communicate information in the course of requirements
engineering. This view was not taken for the sake of really
communicating requirements in [17], but for using the se-
mantics of various speech acts to theoretically (re-)define the
requirements problem originally defined by Zave and Jackson
[19] (see also below). Everything is assumed to be communi-
cated by speech acts here. However, we can only communicate
representations of requirements, and not requirements per se.
It is clear that the text given in the examples in [17] represents
something by describing it, the very confusion addressed in
[16], where specific examples of this confusion are given.
Anyway, for communicating specifications of requirements
to a superintelligence, speech-act theory could be helpful for
annotating the specific kind of speech act, e.g., Question or
Request. For example, the text “Can you produce paperclips?”
may be interpreted either way, unless specified more precisely.
Still, we have to face that ‘perfectly’ specifying and com-
municating requirements to a superintelligence may not be
possible. Even if we could, this would not help in case of
malevolent superintelligence that would not necessarily satisfy
requirements as specified and communicated. Hence, let us
consider building a superintelligence in such a way that these
problems can be mitigated.
IV. RE ON A SUPERINTELLIGENCE
In our view, building a superintelligence should certainly
include RE (much as building any non-trivial system). For
specifically addressing superintelligence safety, we may ig-
nore defining functional requirements on its superintelligent
abilities. Still, some functionality may have to be defined for
operationalizing certain “non-functional” safety requirements,
which will in the first place be cast as constraints on the
superintelligence.
Capability Control
Boxing methods Incentive methods Stunting Tripwires
Fig. 1. Overview of capability control techniques
Working on these requirements could be done as usual
according to best practice of RE. This will involve major
stakeholders (in particular, AI researchers), requirements elic-
itation may be done including questionnaires in the Web,
etc. While the core questions will be about requirements on
superintelligence safety, of course, a bigger question should
be asked in our opinion, what the goals and requirements are
that mankind has regarding AI in the first place.
We expect that RE for superintelligence safety will pose
even greater challenges than the usual practice of RE. After
all, it is not just about conceiving such a superintelligence but
about making sure that its creation will not raise uncontrollable
safety risks.
Let our RE endeavor be also informed by some preliminary
thought by the author who raised the issue of superintelligence
safety. In [1, Chapter 9], controlling a superintelligence is
discussed, in order to deal with this specific safety problem.
Two broad classes of potential methods are distinguished —
capability control and motivation selection. Within each of
them, several specific techniques are examined.
We review the key ideas here, starting with capability
control, where Figure 1 shows an overview of the related
techniques summarized as follows [1, p. 143]:
• Boxing methods
“The system is confined in such a way that it can affect
the external world only through some restricted pre-
approved channel. Encompasses physical and informa-
tional containment methods.”
• Incentive methods
“The system is placed within an environment that pro-
vides appropriate incentives. This could involve social
integration into a world of similarly powerful entities.
Another variation is the use of (cryptographic) reward
tokens. . . . ” (dots inserted)
• Stunting
“Constraints are imposed on the cognitive capabilities of
the system or its ability to affect key internal processes.”
• Tripwires
“Diagnostic tests are performed on the system (possibly
without its knowledge) and a mechanism shuts down the
system if dangerous activity is detected.”
Viewed from an RE perspective, it seems as though most
of what is discussed here could be elaborated as constraint
requirements. Both current theory and practice of RE will most
likely be sufficient for dealing with capability control as laid
out here.
With regard to the ideas on motivation selection, Figure 2
shows an overview of the related techniques summarized as
Motivation Selection
Direct specification Domesticity Indirect normativity Augmentation
Fig. 2. Overview of motivation selection techniques
follows [1, p. 143]:
• Direct specification
“The system is endowed with some directly specified
motivation system, which might be consequentialist or
involve following a set of rules.”
• Domesticity
“A motivation system is designed to severely limit the
scope of the agent’s ambitions and activities.”
• Indirect normativity
“Indirect normativity could involve rule-based or conse-
quentialist principles, but is distinguished by its reliance
on an indirect approach to specifying the rules that are
to be followed or the values that are to be pursued.”
• Augmentation
“One starts with a system that already has substantially
human or benevolent motivations, and enhances its cog-
nitive capacities to make it superintelligent.”
In our opinion, these ideas will be much harder to elaborate
according to the current state of the art in RE than the ideas
on capability control above. When interpreting some of them
in such a way as involving dynamic goals of the superintelli-
gence, GORE comes to mind. However, can the current GORE
approaches and especially the current theoretical formulation
of the RE problem really cover that?
V. TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF THE RE PROBLEM
In order to address this question, we raise further questions:
• What exactly is the requirements problem in this regard?
• Can we cast it in terms of the theoretical requirements
problem?
In this regard, we investigate the state of the art on for-
mulations of the (theoretical) requirements problem. Based
on the seminal work of Zave and Jackson [19], Jureta et
al. [17] extended the formulation of the requirements problem.
The essence of this new formulation is as follows (where the
notation is simplified for the purposes of this paper):
Given:
K domain assumptions
G goals
Q quality constraints and softgoals
A attitudes (preferences)
To be found:
P plans
K,P ∼ G,Q,A
An important change in this formulation is the defeasible
consequence relation for non-monotonic satisfaction instead
of (monotonic) entailment, based on the insight that the latter
would be unrealistic with regard to practice. We consider
this a useful variation of the previous formulation in [19], in
particular with respect to what is given in terms of goals and
softgoals. Hence, this formulation elaborates the RE problem
towards GORE. Goals in GORE research are typically wishes
(desires) of some agent / stakeholder.
In addition, Jureta et al. [17] introduced attitudes for evalu-
ation in terms of degree of favor or disfavor of other elements
in the problem formulation. While the formulation in [19]
assumed that all given “requirements” are compulsory, the
inclusion of attitudes leads to a more realistic formulation
where some are not compulsory but optional. It also covers
preferences for comparison between different components of
the same type, which establishes orders between components
of the same type. (In particular, for each preference order in
A over softgoals, there is a preference order that maintains
that same ordering over quality constraints that stand in the
justified approximation relationship to the given softgoals
defined in [17].) This makes it possible to define an optimum
in terms of stakeholder attitudes.
From a practical point of view, we do not think that both
quality constraints and softgoals (Q) will normally be given a
priori (as assumed in [17]). RE should include the derivation
of quality constraints from softgoals. Such derivations are
actually the key task of the softgoal approach to RE.
In contrast to the original approach in [19], this theoretical
formulation involves goals. However, these are only goals of
stakeholders in RE, while goals of the system-to-be-built itself
are not included.
Later, Jureta et al. [20] formally showed the fundamental
differences between standard RE (as sketched above) and RE
for adaptive systems. A system is adaptive if it can detect
differences between its requirements and runtime performance
and can adjust its behavior to cope with such deviations. It
spans design-time and run-time; design-time, because design
decisions influence the range of monitored inputs for the
system, and the feedback mechanisms it will have; and run-
time, because these mechanisms enable the system to react to
at least some changes rather than ignore them. The solution
concept, called configurable specification, amounts to a set
of requirements configurations and evolution requirements
for switching between configurations. Each configuration is
shown to satisfy all properties required by [17], [19]. During
adaptation, the system switches from one configuration to
another and does so because awareness requirements became
violated during the last period of stability.
The latter RE problem defined for adaptive systems fits
an AI-based software-intensive system most likely better than
the previous RE theory. However, it still takes only goals of
stakeholders into account like [17] but not goals of the system-
to-be-built itself. For more conventional software and systems,
this was not necessary, of course.
Rational agents like those whose decision-making has been
formally verified by Dennis et al. [21] have goals assigned,
but statically and at design-time. Such agents can be designed,
e.g., using the knowledge level software engineering method-
ology for agent-oriented programming Tropos [22].
Tropos takes goals of agents into account for building agent-
oriented software systems. In the course of GORE, the goals
of stakeholders are broken down into goals assigned to agents.
As long as this is done correctly, the goals of the stakeholders
are aligned with the goals of the agents.
However, an AI-based system may also create new goals
itself at run-time [23]. We assume that a superintelligence will
(have to) be able to formulate goals on its own. This is not
covered theoretically yet in terms of theoretical formulations
of requirements problems.
Hence, for treating superintelligence safety as a require-
ments problem, we propose to develop a new theoretical
formulation applicable to it, since it involves goals of both
stakeholders and of the AI-based system-to-be-built. In partic-
ular, it involves that these goals will be aligned, and that the
system-to-be-built can change them itself at run-time. It will be
challenging to capture all this in new theoretical formulations
of extended requirements problems covering superintelligence
safety.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the potentially very important issue
of “AI safety”, in the sense of superintelligence safety [1],
from an RE perspective. To our best knowledge, this is the
first RE approach to this issue, although it may seem obvious
that RE is the very discipline of choice here.
We actually distinguish two different approaches:
• Specifying and communicating requirements for specific
problems to a concrete superintelligence, and
• Doing RE in the course of building a superintelligence
in the sense of an AI-based software-intensive system.
Based on common wisdom of RE at the current state of
the art, we tentatively conclude that ‘perfectly’ specifying and
communicating requirements to a superintelligence may not
be possible. And even if this became possible in the future,
it would not help in case of malevolent superintelligence that
would not necessarily satisfy requirements as specified and
communicated.
Hence, we envision doing RE on a superintelligence to
be built. Such an RE endeavor could be informed by some
preliminary thought on controlling a superintelligence in [1].
The first approach through capability control may be dealt
with properly through constraint requirements. The second ap-
proach for controlling through motivation selection, however,
appears to go beyond the current theory of RE. In particular,
we raise the challenge of extending GORE with dynamic goals
of a superintelligence.
After having revisited the existing formulations of the (the-
oretical) requirements problem, we tentatively conclude that
new and extended formulations will be needed for theoretically
founded RE on superintelligence. Defining a new requirements
problem for a dynamic goal model of the system-to-be-built
is a challenge, but the impact on an improved understanding
of problems like “AI safety” (in the sense of superintelligence
safety) would be great.
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